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IN1RODUCTION 
~he past three decades have witnessed dramatic growth in the domain of economics. Economists now study such diverse subjects as education, 
fertility, discrimination, voting, marriage, health, crime, and addiction. Even so, 
few economists have applied their analytic tools to the study of religion. Secular 
economists tend to ignore religion altogether or else view it as an exogenous 
characteristic like race or sex. Christian economists too, despite much work on 
economics and religion, have said little about the economics of religion. They 
have critiqued economic theory and economic policies from the standpoint of 
moral and religious values and have analyzed religiously motivated pronounce­
ments such as the Catholic Bishops' Pastoral from the standpoint of economic 
logic. But rarely have they used economic theory to account for religious practice 
or religious institutions. 
It is not for lack of precedent that contemporary economists shun the econom­
ics of religion. Adam Smith devoted some twenty-five pages of The Wealth of 
Nations to the analysis of religious institutions, arguing that established religions 
face the same incentive problems as other state monopolies (Smith [1776] 1965, p. 
740). Although Smith's analysis laid the foundation for a theory of religious 
markets, two centwies passed without any serious attempts to build upon it. 
Our personal experiences suggest that secular and religious economists often. 
avoid the economics of religion for opposite reasons. Secular economists, to­
gether with the majority of academics and intellectuals, tend to see religion as an 
uninteresting vestige of pre-scientific times. Despite the 1980's resurgence of 
evangelical fundamentalism, most secular economists view religious belief, , behavior, and institutions as increasingly unimportant aspects of modem life. 
They therefore greet work on the economics of religion with a mixture of amuse­




exactly reversed. Religion is so important, its truths so profound, that it inevita­I 
~, bly transcends social-scientific inquiry. There is therefore a natural tendency to 
question the validity of an "economics of religion." The very idea strikes many as 
naive, futile, or even offensive. 
1 
Collegiate skepticism notwithstanding, a handful of economists recently have 
turned their attention to the economics of religion. Their work employs the same 
methodology that characterizes other attempts to expand the domain of econom­
ics, and their substantive concerns tend to mirror those in the sociology of religion 
(i.e., understanding the determinants of religious behavior and the characteristics 
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... our goal is 
not to reduce 
religion to a 
purelyeco­
nomic phenom­
ena, but rather 
merely to illu­
minatesome 
aspects of it. 
mists are not uniformly religious or irreligious, but rather bring to the subject a 
variety of perspectives, convictions, and motivations. 
This essay is designed to familiarize readers with the economics of religion, 
make its literature more accessible, and encourage further contributions to that 
literature. We begin by outlining work on the religious behavior of individuals 
and households, proceed to analyses of religious groups and institutions, and 
conclude with work on religious markets. Along the way, we attempt to maintain 
a relatively neutral perspective. Since most readers will have read few if any of 
the papers we describe, a methodological critique or defense seems premature. 
Moreover, given our own enthusiasm for the subject, any critique would be half­ fhearted, and any defense, self-serving. Suffice it to say that our goal is not to 
reduce religion to a purely economic phenomena, but rather merely to illuminate 
some aspects of it. We would place our efforts on the same level as other social­
scientific studies of religion and hope that people of faith approach them in the 
same way that they approach research in the sociology, psychology, and anthro­
pology of religion. 
INDNIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS Ehrenberg's predictions is mixed. Their 
Contemporary research on the eco­ own regression analysis of survey data 
nomics of religion begins with Azzi and tends to confirm their predictions, as does 
Ehrenberg's (1975) analysis of household additional analysis by Ehrenberg (1977). 
religious activity. Azzi and Ehrenberg But surveys analyzed by Long and Settle 
develop a model.of religious participation (1977) and Ulbrich and Wallace (1983, 
that is for the most part a straightforward 1984) find no evidence that "afterlife 
application of the "new home economics" consumption motives" causes religious 
pioneered by Gary Becker (1976). Indi­ participation to increase with age, nor that 
viduals are assumed to allocate time and women's higher rates of religiosity can be 
goods to maximize the utility derived from explained in terms of lower alternative 
a set of household commodities, one of wages (c.f.DeVaus, 1984). Sullivan's 
which happens to be religion. (1985) simultaneous equations test of the 
In Azzi and Ehrenberg's framework, relationship between church contributions 
the primary motivation for religious and attendance finds weak support for 
participating is assumed to be "afterlife Azzi and Ehrenberg's model. 
consumption." This amounts to a strong Researchers also have questioned Azzi 
restriction.on the way religiouscommodi­ and Ehrenberg's theoretical assumptions, 
ties enter household utility functions. most notably the assumptions that afterlife 
Together with the assumption that the consumption is the major motivator of 
marginal product of inputs devoted to religious activity and that religious com­
religion is independent of age, the restric­ modities are simple functions of goods and 
tion implies that religious participation time. The standard goods-time framework 
increases with age. Efficiency conditions abstracts from the collective side of 
also require that households with lower religious activity, suggests statistical 
values of time produce religious commodi­ models little different from those em­
ties in a more time-intensive manner, and ployed by sociologists, and has little to say 
that within a given household, relatively about the strongest predictors of indi­
more time be supplied by members with vidual participation: .denomination, 
lower altemativewages (typically, wives). personal belief, and family background. 
The empirical support for Azzi and Iannaccone (1984, 1980)attempts to 
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overcome the limitations of the goods-time 
framework by extending Azzi and 
Ehrenberg's model to incorporate the 
a~umwationofHreli~oush~ncapi­
tal." The extended model explains age 
trends in terms of experience effects and 
habit fonnation rather than afterlife 
concerns. The model.also generates 
predictions concerning denominational 
mobility, religious intermarriage, and 
conversion ages. Other extensions of the 
Azzi and Ehrenberg model are presented 
by Redman (1980), who models the 
production of Hpersonal salvation" as 
more time-intensive than Hsocial welfare," 
and by Neuman (1982, 1986, c.f. Neuman 
and Grossbard-Shechtman 1984), whose 
analysis of time devoted to religious 
practice takes account of (myopic) habit 
formation. Greely and Durkin (1991) have 
developed a model of religious choice 
under uncertainty that views Hfaith" as a 
type of human capital. 
RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND INSTITU­
TIONS 
Most recent research shifts its focus 
from individuals and households to 
groups and institutions. Simple models of 
isolated utility maximizers, constrained 
only by personal income and commodity 
prices, have given way to models that 
emphasize the role of specialized firms or 
clubs in the production of religious 
commodities. These models may over­
come shortcomings in the earlier work 
which, though designed to predict church 
attendance, never really addressed the 
existence of churches. 
The papers that fall into this category 
are diverse. However, most share the 
working assumption that religious activity 
can be viewed as rising out of the interac­
tion of (clergy) producers andOay) con­
sumers of religious commodities. Hence, 
most draw heavily on the theory of the 
firm. A few papers emphasize religion as 
a collective activity and so take club theory 
as their starting point. 
By modeling churches as firms, 
researchers attempt to explain the devel­
opment of religious doctrine, the organiza­
tional structure of religious institutions, 
and the evolution of reli~ous practices. 
For example, Ireland (1989) examines the 
role of entrepreneurship in the formation 
of new religions, and Dolin, Slesnick, and 
Byrd (1989) explain the organizational 
structure of contemporary denominations 
in terms of a franchising model. Finke and 
Stark (1989) argue that the explosive 
growth of the Methodist and Baptist 
denominations in nineteenth century 
America was due to their clergy's superior 
marketing and incentives relative to those 
of the Congregationalists, Presbyterians, 
and Episcopalians. 
Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (1989) 
use the model of a monopoly firm to ex­
plain the medieval Catholic church's usury 
docbine. Here rent seeking is the primary 
motivation of the church hierarchy. The 
central church's monopoly position 
allowed it to extract rents from down­
stream producers (the clergy) and from 
input suppliers (banks) by controlling the 
borrowing and lending interest rates. 
If churches act as producers, then it is 
natural to ask about the commodities they 
produce. A key insight from this research 
is that important church products are pub­
lic goods. Indeed, this research argues that 
the collective nature of religious produc­
tion explains many differences in church 
structure, doctrine, and organization. 
Bold and Hull (1989, 1991; c.f. Hull 
and Bold 1989) stress property rights 
enforcement and appropriate social 
behavior as critical, albeit unintended, 
collective goods in the church's product 
mix. They test this hypothesis with cross­
sectional data comparing rates of religious 
adherence and criminal activity and data 
on religious characteristics across cultures. 
Their model explains aspects of churches 
as diverse as church building architecture 
and priestly clothing. Davies (1986) also 
emphasizes church. provision of collective 
goods like social insurance and appropri­
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church as a case study. 
Anderson (1989; 1989b) views the 
medieval Catholic church as a powerful, 
profit maximizing monopoly that 
benefitted from well-defined property 
rights. Anderson argues that property 
rights issues shaped the Church's applica­
tion and modification of doctrines con­
cerning penance in this life and heaven, 
hell, and purgatory in the next.· Arguing 
in a similar vein, Hull (1989) shows how 
changes in Catholic church teachings 
about hell and·purgatory were innovative 
~ methods of enforcing property rights in 
the High Middle Ages, a time when nation 
states had not yet assumed responsibility 
for property rights enforcement in the 
newly emerging cities. 
Although religious institutions mani­
fest many firm-like characteristics, the 
standard distinction between producer 
and consumer is only partially applicable 
to churches. Congregations, like families, 
combine the functions of production and 
consumption. Aside from a few full-time 
religious professionals and a handful of 
benchwarmers, most church members act 
as both producers and consumers of 
religious commodities. Moreover, many 
religious activities, especially acts of public 
worship and charity, generate public 
benefit. These facts have motivated some 
economists to model churches as economic 
clubs rather than neoclassical firms. 
McChesney (1987) models churches as 
producers of congestable, impure public 
goods. Hence, his analysis focuses on 
issues of optimal number of clubs in a 
society. Halteman (1988) draws on public 
choice theory to address a similar set of 
issues. Both of these papers predict an 
inverse relationship between church size 
and contribution rates. Upford (1990) uses 
a similar approach but reports empirical 
results that contradict McChesney's and 
Halteman's implications. Other econo­
mists interested in religious clubs and free­
rider problems include Sullivan (1985), 
Pautler (1977), and especially, Wallis (1990, 
1991). 
Iannaccone (forthcoming) develops a 
different kind of club model, one that 
assumes positive returns to llparticipatory 
crowding/'In this model, which assumes 
that the increased paticipation of one 
member raises the utility of other mem­
bers, apparently gratuitous sacrifices can 
function to mitigate free rider problems. 
Perfectly rational individuals may thus 
find it in their interest to join so-called 
I'sects" and llcults"· that demand stigma, 
self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral 
standards._Atlhe-same-time, other people 
will find it optimal to fonn less demanding 
groups, such as mainstream churches. The 
distinction between demanding "sects" 
and mainstream "churches" is also ana­
lyzed in Iannaccone (1988)~and Schaefer 
(1988). 
RELIGIOUS MARKETS 
The introduction to this essay noted 
that Adam Smith devoted some twenty­
five pages of The Wealth ofNations to the 
analysis of religious institutions. Ap­
proaching the subject from the market 
level, Smith argued that established 
religions face the same incentive problems 
that plague other state monopolies: 
The teachers of [religion]... , in the 
same manner as other teachers, may 
either depend altogether for their 
subsistence upon the voluntary 
contributions of their hearers; or they 
may derive it from some other fund 
to which· the law of their country may 
entitle them ... Their exertion, their 
zeal and industry, are likely to be 
much greater in the former situation 
than the latter. In this respect the 
teachers of new religions have always 
had a considerable advantage in 
attacking those ancient and estalr 
lished systems of which the clergy, 
reposing themselves upon their 
benefices, had neglected to keep up 
the fervor of the faith and devotion in 
the greatbody of the people ... 
(Smith [1776] 1965, pp. 740-741). 
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Smith's analysis lays the foundation 
for a theory of religious markets, a theory 
in which self-interest motivates clergy just 
as it does secular producers; market forces 
constrain churches just as they do secular 
firms; and the benefits of competition, the 
burdens of monopoly, and the hazards of 
government regulation are as real as in 
any other sector of the economy. Ander­
son (1988) reviews Smith's theory in some 
detail. Posner (1987) and McConnell and 
Posner (1989) apply Smith's insights to an 
analysis of the first amendment's impact 
on religion in America. Iannaccone (1991) 
uses the contemporary theory of regula­
tion to extend Smith's analysis. 
Levy (1978, 1988) also refers to Smith 
but uses Smith's treatment of morals and 
religion to model the ch~rch as a provider 
of information and behavioral restrictions 
that can increase individual utility. The 
model assumes that individuals have 
limited information and non-eonvex utility 
functions, from which it follows that 
individuals' efforts to maximize their 
utility often lead to local, rather than 
global, maxima. Under these circum­
stances, a church's religious and moral 
teachings can function as exogenous 
constraints that steer people toward their 
true optimum. 
Smith's theory has also been subjected 
to empirical tests. Iannaccone (1991) 
examines contemporary data from eigh­
teen countries to see if competition stimu­
lates religious activity. He finds that 
among Protestants, church attendance, 
belief in God, and the perceived impor­
tance of religion are all greater in countries 
with numerous competing churches than 
in countries dominated by a single church. 
Finke and Stark (1988) and Stark and 
McCann (1989) draw similar conclusions 
based on the analysis of contemporary 
and historical data across cities in the U.S. 
Finke (1988) reviews the impact of Ilde­
regulation" in American religious history, 
showing that rates of church membership 
rose as the colonial pattern of. established 
churches and d~ facto religious monopoly 
gave way to a free religious market Hull 
and Moran (1989) draw similar conclu­
sions based on their analysis of a colonial 
church membership time series. As many 
of these authors emphasize, the economic 
approach to religious markets yields 
predictions that contradict the long­
standing sociological assumption that 
religious pluralism undermines religiosity 
and facilitates secularization. 
CONCLUSION 
The nexus of religion and ec0!l0mics is 
complex and multi-faceted. The econom­
ics of religion as defined and reviewed in 
this essay is but one approach to that 
nexus. It is not our intent to tout it imperi­
alistically. Nevertheless, the approach 
deserves serious, scholarly attention. To 
sociologists of religion, the economic 
approach offers a new theoretical orienta­
tion, more systematic, and perhaps more 
fruitful than the diverse generalizations 
previously used to explain religious 
behavior and institutions. To economists 
of faith, the economics of religion provides 
a new way to apply professional skills to a 
subject of great personal importance. And 
even to secular economists with no par­
ticular interest in religion, the topic holds 
out the tantalizing prospect of their 
discipline illuminating yet another area of 
human behavior. _ 
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